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“Zoopoetic Dwelling”: The Ecology 
of the Connectedness of Animal and 
Human Homes and Dwelling Through 
Folklore and Literary Representations*
Marjetka Golež Kaučič
The act of dwelling and physical dwellings is not an exclusively human domain: all spaces, 
environments and homes of various animals are included. The question of whether an 
animal merely exists or also lives and dwells forms the basis of the article. We examine 
the types of environment in which nonhuman animals live either together with people 
or independently and those where they build their dwellings. We look at the difference 
between dwelling and building. We will present three viewpoint models that consider 
animals, their dwelling and physical dwellings on the basis of folkloristic, anthropological, 
philosophical, eco-critical, and critical-animalistic findings. They are the anthropocentric, 
anthropomorphic, and zoo-centric models as they appear in the works of Fran Erjavec 
(Domače in tuje živali v podobah, 1868-1873), Richard Adams (Watership Down, 1972) 
and Iztok Geister (Narava, kot jo vidi narava, 2010). The way these works present animals 
and their dwellings, more or less closely reflecting reality, will aid in determining whether 
these dwellings are part of nature or culture. We will be asking, for example, whether 
the beaver’s dwelling is an architectural masterpiece or merely a result of instinctive 
behaviour. Our starting point is based on the understanding that animals are persons and, 
as such, are capable of dwelling and intentionally producing their physical dwellings. 
KEYWORDS: zoopoetic dwelling, animals, animal culture, anthropocentrism, anthro-
pomorphism, zoo-ecocentrism, zoopoetics, Fran Erjavec, Richard Adams, Iztok Geister
INTRODUCTION
We aim to critically present three models of human viewpoints on animals from the 
perspective of dwelling, animal dwellings, and their production by critically analysing 
three zoo-eco literary and folklore works: Domače in tuje živali v podobah (Domestic 
and Foreign Animals in Pictures), 1868-1873, by Fran Erjavec, Watership Down, 
1972, by Richard Adams and Narava kot jo vidi narava (Nature as Seen by Nature), 
2010, by Iztok Geister. Based on zoofolkloristic, eco-critical, and critical-animalistic 
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concepts, the analyses of these literary works should allow us to establish, also through 
literature and folklore, understanding and knowledge of animal individuals and their 
intrinsic values.
This article aims to answer the following questions: 
1. Is there awareness to animal dwelling, are their dwellings only part of nature or 
also culture and are their dwellings a result of an instinctive skill or there is even 
an element of art?
2. Are animal dwellings a result of intentional, cognitive action, or are they created 
purely instinctively? 
3. What kind of human and nonhuman encounters can we detect when observing 
different animal dwellings (created by animals and humans) and what are these 
encounters like when animal dwelling meets human interests? 
ONTOLOGICAL EQUIVALENCE OR ONTOLOGICAL DIFFERENTIATION OF 
ANIMALS AND PEOPLE (DWELLING/EXISTING)
The following concepts form the basis of our thought: Jakob von Uexküll acknowl-
edges the living and active nature of animal beings; Lorenz and Tinbergen find that 
animals communicate with each other; Adolphe Portmann acknowledges the existential 
value of animal manifestation (Merleau Pointy, 1995: 244-247). In addition, there is 
Tim Ingold’s early anthropological viewpoint on the ontological equivalence of humans 
and animals, which he later substituted with ontological differentiation, which we aim 
to assess critically: 
Now the ontological equivalence of humans and animals, as organism-per-
sons and as fellow participants in a life process, carries a corollary of capital 
importance. It is that both can have points of view. In other words, for both 
the world exists as a meaningful place, constituted in relation to the pur-
poses and capabilities of action of the being in question. (Ingold 2000: 51)
These findings take us to the world of animal and human dwelling. Both are equal in 
all aspects of life. Ingold also emphasises that all living creatures have agency: 
The world is not “there” for us or anyone else to represent or to fail to 
represent; the world is come into being through our activities […] we 
cannot exclusively privilege us human beings with this world-producing 
effort – for the world is coming into being through the activities of all living 
agencies. (Ingold 1996: 115)
However, he contradicts himself, as on the one hand, he allows for the similarities 
between people and animals in the way they transfer knowledge to their offspring, while, on 
the other hand, he attributes cognizant, deliberate production of dwellings only to people: 
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I felt sure that the models developed by ecologists and evolutionary biolo-
gists to account for the relations between organisms and their environment 
must apply as well to the human as to any other species, yet it was also 
clear to me that these models left no space for what seemed to be most 
outstanding characteristic of human activity – that it is intentionally mo-
tivated. (Ingold 1995: 57) 
In his book, The Perception of the Environment, Essays of Livelihood, Dwelling 
and Skill (2000), Ingold, who worked intensively on animal dwelling and animal home 
production, sought to move closer to the new ecology. He based his thought on Neo-Dar-
winism, ecological psychology and philosophy, and the works of Martin Heidegger and 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty. He agreed with Heidegger’s viewpoint that animals do not shape 
the world, they merely are, but without their objective reality, “we can build only if we 
dwell” (Heidegger 1971: 160), which also represented Ingold’s point of view: it was the 
‘founding statement of the dwelling perspective’ (Ingold 2000). He supported the static 
model of animal dwelling that derives from the actions of animals’ predecessors:
For any animal, the environmental conditions of development are liable 
to be shaped by the activities of predecessors. The beaver, for example, 
inhabits an environment that has been decisively modified by the labours 
of its forbearers, in building dams and lodges, and will in turn contribute 
to the fashioning of an environment for its progeny. It is in such a modified 
environment that the beaver’s own bodily orientations and patterns of activity 
undergo development. The same goes for human beings. (Ingold 2000: 186)
Ingold answers the question of whether the beaver’s physical dwelling is any diffe-
rent from that of the human positively; unlike the human, by stating that the beaver does 
not construct creatively: “Wherever they are, beavers construct the same kinds of lodges 
and, so far as we know, have always done so” (Ingold 2000: 175). He believes that the 
difference between the animal and the human house is in the construction process, which 
is purposeful in humans. We can agree to a certain extent with Ingold if we understand 
human actions, which can be verbalised, in any case. However, defining the beaver’s 
creation of its home as the result of an instinctive process is anthropocentric thinking 
that predetermines the beaver as being cognitively and creatively inferior to the human. 
Therefore we need to refute any thought of the instinctive determination of animals, or, 
in the words of Ramirez Baretto: 
An illusion considering the animal as determined, mechanical, instinctive 
and limited to mere corporeality (ontogenetic constitution); or as an evo-
lutionary past that has been left behind with the acquisition of tools and 
language (phylogenetic condition), looking upon humanity as purifying 
and distancing its own human spaces, without animals (social, cultural and 
historical constitution). (Ramirez Baretto 2009: 84)
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Ingold also looked at the works of semiologist and ethologist Jakob von Uexküll, who 
in his book A Stroll Through the World of Animals and Men wrote: “As the spider spins 
its threads, every subject spins his relations to certain characters of the things around 
him, and weaves them into a firm web which carries his existence” (1957:14). Uexküll 
believes that both animals and humans are subjects. The animal inhabits its own world, 
which he calls Umwelt. The world, as seen by the animal, when it decides to create a 
home or to find an existing home in nature is, of course, different than that of the human. 
This, however, emphasises the differentiation only in the way a home is created, but not 
the distinction in the hierarchy and superiority of human production. Uexküll invites 
people to imagine the inhabitants (a fox, an owl, a squirrel) of an oak tree; they use the 
tree as their physical dwelling, a home. Humans, however, generally see such a tree only 
as a simple tree or a source of wood. These animals occupy the oak according to their 
needs (the owl is in the trunk, the fox burrows between the roots and the squirrel uses 
it as a ladder to climb from one branch to another). Uexküll does not contemplate what 
kind of cognitive production animals apply to these actions; he concludes that human 
understanding of animals’ physical dwellings is completely different from that of animals 
(1957). The question is whether an individual animal’s occupation of the physical space, 
for example, a tree, a trunk, a burrow or a beaver’s dam, is intentional, cognizant or the 
animal only adapts it according to its instinctive behaviour. Moreover, does every animal 
build its own dwelling space, although it may seem to be one or the same space at first 
glance? Uexküll believes that “The same tree, thus, figures quite differently within the 
respective Umwelten of its diverse inhabitants” (taken from Ingold 2000: 177; Uexküll 
1957: 76-9). He understands Umwelt as: “Perceptual and effector worlds together form a 
closed unit.” (Uexküll, 1957: 6). However, whether this is an intentional, cognizant choice 
or merely adaptation is the question that cognitive ethology aims to answer. Cognitive 
ethology sees the animal as a largely cognizant being, a subject whose key activeness 
consists of “perceiving and acting”. Uexküll believes that cognitive activity is not char-
acteristic of animals, which is still a very much anthropocentric point of view. Although 
Lotman and Uexküll are both representatives of semiotics or zoo-semiotics, they strived 
to understand animals’ activeness. Lotman nevertheless thought that the behaviour of 
some animals was programmed while others might have developed behaviours that could 
resemble the language of folklore. 
I see the principal and for me still inexplicable difference between the living 
being for which the important moments of life are preprogrammed, and 
humans whose behaviour may include unexpected actions, and for whom 
those inherently non-preprogrammed types of behaviour cover an ever 
larger part of life and gradually become the man. This is quite amazing, 
come to think of it. (Lotman 1990: 15-16)
His most surprising conclusion, however, is that “evidently, man, when he appeared, 
resembled a mad animal, and I suppose that was the reason why this relatively weak 
creature could survive and kill much bigger animals. They did not predict his behaviour.” 
“ZOOPOETIC DWELLING”: THE ECOLOGY OF THE CONNECTEDNESS OF ANIMAL AND ... 209 
(Lotman 1990: 15-16, 19). This may be true, if we base our assumptions on human dom-
inance over other living creatures. Lotman moves entirely within speech and cognition, 
believing that zoo-semiotics is a part of linguistics only, which takes us again into the 
area of binary division. Animals, be they mammals or other, will never be able to develop 
speech in the sense human beings have done. And why should they? They have their own 
ways of communicating and their own ways of understanding and forming the world. 
Animals do not care about humans as long as we let them live and develop according to 
their own laws of nature, do not disrupt their lives and do not push them out of the world 
we aggressively want to enter. The structures of the animal world are highly complicated, 
and we cannot claim to understand them, but we can acknowledge them. (cf. Lotman 
1995). Lotman also enters the so-called “fallacy of dualism”.
Does the animal possess abilities of crafts, creativity, and skill? If so, are these abilities 
within the domain of culture or nature? Like others, Ingold speaks of skills typical for 
people and for animals, for example, a person’s skill to create a wicker basket and the skill 
a bird uses to make a nest. However, again, he believes that the bird already possesses 
this skill while the person has had to learn it (Ingold 2000)1 Is the nest-making skill innate 
or does the bird learn it from its parents and later develops its own innovative building 
techniques? It does not seem right to accept inertia as the only drive to build a nest. The 
bird needs to find material, appropriate space, and then create a sturdy nest. Building a 
nest requires cognitive processes. Unfortunately, Ingold emphasises human creativity that 
is cognitively driven. He is ambivalent and uncertain about animal creativity. However, 
it seems that animal constructions may be seen as a type of architecture, birds’ nests, for 
example, which reflect inventiveness and design functionality. Therefore, it is safe to say 
that we can consider the construction of animal dwellings created by animals themselves 
as the start of cognitive process and aesthetics (e.g., fish mandalas, birds’ nests) and not 
only as functionality. Ingold is not entirely consistent; even though he talks about an 
ontological equivalence of people and animals, he believes only humans have the unique 
tool in the form of language, something he calls “skills of skills” (1998/2000: 361), which 
allows us to apply our reason innovatively and to plan production and work processes. 
This belief, however, puts the human being above the animal once again, and Ingold’s 
viewpoint turns back towards anthropocentrism. He reflects on some types of animal 
architecture,2 on the fact that animals have certain skills, maybe even artistic ability, 
when building their dwellings. He believes that every animal can have the skill to build 
its dwelling. His examples include the shell, the beaver’s dwelling and a human house. 
He sees them on a scale: the shell ranks the lowest, the beaver is a bit higher, while the 
human house is at the top:
1 Montaigne believed that animals are better at certain things than humans are: when in danger, oxen, pigs 
and other creatures form groups. Schools of tuna have been known to form perfect squares, so they understand 
geometry and arithmetic. A kingfisher can build a structure out of bones that serves both as its nest and as a 
boat, so the bird can test it on the shore before setting off to sea (Montaigne 1580, taken from Bakewell 2014: 
118-123).
2 This expression was first used by ethologist Karl von Frisch (1974).
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The shell, it is said, ‘just grows’ – there is nothing the mollusc can or need 
do about it. The beaver, by contrast, works hard to put its lodge together: 
the lodge is a product of the beaver’s ‘beavering’, of its activity. Likewise, 
the house is a product of the activities of its human builders. In their re-
spective forms, and levels of complexity, they need not be that different. 
Should we, then, conclude that the lodge is beaver-made just as much as 
the house is man-made? (Ingold 2000: 174-175)
Cognitive ethologist Donald Griffin proved that the beaver can be very innovative 
when building its home:
Captive beavers have modified their customary patterns of lodges – and 
dam-building behaviour by piling material around a vertical pole at the top 
of which was located food that they could not otherwise reach. They are also 
very ingenious at plunging water leaks, sometimes cutting pieces of wood 
to fit a particular hole through which water is escaping. (Griffin 2001: 1)
Griffin further observed that animals are aware of themselves and the surrounding 
world, “the animal’s own body and its own actions must fall within the scope of its 
perceptual consciousness,” (Griffin 2001: 274). Ingold wrote that the genetic determin-
ism of animal organisms, which may be innate to animals and consequently animals 
should always react and build their homes in the same manner, is “the great delusions 
of modern biology” and the beaver can only enter the “development process” (Ingold 
2000: 186). Still, he was not entirely certain of human and animal equality when 
discussing the process of human and animal architecture. In his opinion, there is on-
tological equivalence, but not in the thought process, planning and innovativeness of 
the building activity. He believes that the latter is only characteristic of the human as 
the animal is not capable of being innovative predominantly due to being non-verbal 
and incapable of cognitive planning. From the perspective of critical animalism, Ingold 
stops halfway. Ontological equality does not suffice – there should be true equality in 
every way. Difference is possible only because of the difference of species, but there 
is none on the cognitive level. Ramirez Baretto does not stop at ontological equality; 
she believes that:
[…] for ontology to be viable it must be in composition with ecological 
anthrozoology and with the “poetic of dwelling” we hear from different 
agents (some of them are human), in different contexts. Ontology as a 
revelation of existence from an isolated subjectivity elevated to a pure 
and universal form is, in my view, a dull metaphysical delusion. (Ramirez 
Baretto 2009: 103) 
Steven Best, representative of critical animal studies, also points out:
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Complex form of intelligence rum broad and deep throughout the world of 
animals. Birds, for instance, have complex memories and abilities to map 
vast spaces (the speciesist slander ‘bird brain? Could not be more spurious) 
and some bird species use tools and exhibit problem-solving skills as well…
some of the whales, dolphins and gorillas, chimpanzees have significant 
rational and linguistic abilities. (Best 2009: 17)
Animals are also capable of self-awareness and self-identity. Furthermore, he believes 
that animals can develop culture: 
Their world [i.e., great apes] is governed not only by instincts and chem-
icals, but also through rules and norms. Like us, they live in a culture of 
shared communication and learning that is passed down from generation to 
generation. The intelligence of primates is not innate and fixed, but rather, 
like ours, an important part is socially constructed in the context of culture 
and technological innovation. (Best 2009: 18)
Steven Best quite rightly goes against a binary and hierarchical structure of the world 
that puts the human at the first place: 
But humans are not unique in their possession of a neocortex; of complex 
emotions like love, loneliness, empathy, and shame; of sophisticated 
languages, behaviors, and communities; and even of aesthetic and moral 
sensibilities. Human beings stand out in the degree to which they have 
developed capacities and potential for reason, language, consciousness, 
aesthetic, ethics, culture, and technology far beyond chimpanzees and 
other animals. (Best 2009: 22)
Given these words, denying the animals’ ability to plan and to apply cognitive 
processes when building their homes is a distinct fallacy. Both people and animals are 
builders and dwellers. Therefore, if we create the world, we build it, and so we both 
make part of not only nature but also of culture. However, how can we understand the 
inner world of animals? Does the animal inhabit the world only without changing it? 
This outlook is highly anthropocentric: the animal does not just appear in the world and 
then disappears when it dies.
On the contrary, it changes its own world and that of the people within it – it creates 
its own reality. Just looking at a dog that is shown its bed, we can see that the dog will 
change it, if only just a little. So, the animal is not only “here”; it fills up “the here” with 
its attitude. Consequently, it is not only part of nature, it can also have its own culture and 
forms its own world in its own way, differently from the way a human would. Therefore 
the poetics of the world is not only the poetics of the human world but also that of nature, 
animals and plants. 
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MODELS OF VIEWPOINTS ON ANIMALS AND THEIR DWELLING FROM 
LITERATURE AND FOLKLORE
1. Anthropocentric model: human superiority + religion + speciesism + empathy = ethical 
anthropocentrism. The human being in this model is aware of himself and is cognitive 
(i.e., has agency), while the animal lacks awareness and is cognitively inferior to the 
human (i.e., lacks agency). Fran Erjavec belongs to this group.
2. Anthropomorphic model: negative or positive/critical anthropomorphism of animals, 
which either transfers human characteristics into the animal world or presents itself as 
the ability to empathise with animals and acknowledge their value and characteristics, 
or as the inability to recognise the true essence of the animal. A representative of 
this model is Richard Adams, who establishes critical anthropomorphism and partial 
eco-criticism.
3. Eco-zoocentric model: self-aware and cognitive humans (human agency) and animals 
as persons, they are self-aware, cognitively different from humans but, nevertheless, 
their equals. Iztok Geister partly belongs to this group, while Jure Detela is fully 
representative of this model.
We will present three different literary thematisations of animal dwelling and physical 
dwellings from the anthropocentric, anthropomorphic, and zoocentric points of view. 
These three examples will be treated as cases that show the change in the human attitude 
to animal dwelling and will present the production of animal dwellings as dealt with in 
the zoo-literature of the 19th century, in fiction novel as the fantasy of anthropomorphic 
animals and in the so-called eco-literature. We aim to utilise the new readings of these 
works to present the realities of animal dwelling in the modern world in a zoopoetic way. 
All three outlooks point to different possibilities of either co-existence or the impossibility 
of co-existence of animals and humans. They may even reflect the domination of one 
species over the other in the framework of animal dwellings, their production and then 
in the way animal dwellings are deserted, lost, gained and inhabited again. 
THE ANTHROPOCENTRIC MODEL AND SPECIESISM
What is anthropocentrism? “Anthropocentrism refers to a form of human centredness 
that places humans not only at the centre of everything but makes ‘us’ the most important 
measure of all things” (Fiona Probyn-Rapsey 2018: 47). “Anthropocentrism is a model, 
a concept, a view that places the human being in the decision-making position, at the top 
of the pyramid where the most important parts of nature are gathered, while the value 
of those below diminishes gradually on the way to the bottom. The area of morality is 
limited to the human community, only human interests and needs are of any importance, 
and on the surface anything is acceptable” (Sruk 1999: 35). Other beings do not possess 
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inherent value. Anthropocentrism is a model that puts the human in the centre of its 
viewpoint, concept and discourse and cares only about human interests. Animals are 
mere objects or a commodity (Grušovnik 2016: 62-64). Animal studies differ between 
inevitable and arrogant anthropocentrism.
Inevitable anthropocentrism is related to the fact that one is human, with human 
perspectives that do not negate the possibility that we can also learn to appreciate and 
understand the perspectives of others. Our “locatedness”, as she calls it, should not 
preclude an openness to others. If it does, then we have settled into a form of arrogant 
anthropocentrism that allows us to resign from the problem or claim some superhuman 
detachment from it. (Gruen 2015: 24).
Anthropocentrism is also called anthroparchy, and human domination (Cudworth 2008: 
34). These definitions derive from animal studies and not from critical animal studies. 
The latter rejects anthropocentrism entirely. Belcourt argues that anthropocentrism is 
connected to other axes of oppression and that it functions as the “anchor of speciesism, 
capitalism and settler colonialism” offering “a decolonial ethic that accounts for animal 
bodies as resurgent bodies” (2015: 3-4). Gary Steiner, who has authored works of critical 
animal studies, says:
The key to overcoming anthropocentric prejudice towards animals (and 
perhaps other beings) is to cultivate a sense of kinship with them as fellow 
members of the Earth’s community of life, a community in which each 
animal, like each human being, is the teleological centre of life striving to 
realise its own good in its unique way. (Steiner 2008: 141)
He continues: “Once we recognise that animals are in all essential respect identical with 
us and that the difference lies merely in the degree of intelligence, we will acknowledge 
that we owe to the animal not mercy but justice.” (Steiner 2008: 142). Speciesism is sim-
ilarly discriminatory; it discriminates based on species (Ryder 2011, Dunayer 2009). This 
discrimination is determined by hierarchy; the human is at the top, and all other species 
are subordinate. Therefore, we could say that anthropocentrism and speciesism are closely 
related. Consequently, Bekoff, for example, believes that today the use of the word “species” 
is problematic. Instead, individuals within a species should be referred to as we cannot 
define the behaviour of one individual as a model for its entire species (Bekoff 2008: 151).
From this, we can conclude that the anthropocentric model puts the human being at 
the top of the pyramid, which can be applied to animal dwelling and production of homes 
throughout the literary discourse. 
One noted anthropocentric writer was Fran Erjavec. In addition to placing the human 
being in the central position, he leaned into Christian theology, which considers the 
human being the ruler of the world, the only being to possess a soul and verbal abilities. 
Erjavec was a writer and a zoologist. He worked in the period from the mid-1800s to the 
end of the 19th century. In a way, he created a two-way connection between zoology and 
literature, so we could say that his work combines science and literature. His best-known 
work is Domače in tuje živali v podabah (Domestic and Foreign Animals in Pictures, 
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1868-1873). The book describes in detail various animals that are defined based on their 
species. Erjavec connected literature and environmental writing and presented many 
different animals and their homes. His view of animals was anthropocentric; for him, 
the human is the master of the universe. However, he includes the empathic principle 
by which man is not allowed to torture animals. He used two concepts: the synanthropic 
view, which treats animals as harmful, and the anthropophilic view, which regards animals 
as useful (e.g., Visković 1996). The book includes quotations of folk songs, proverbs 
and peoples’ beliefs about individual animals. His way of telling stories about animals 
and their homes resembles fables. He still distinguishes between nature and culture, and 
he sees animal buildings and skills only as instinctive acts. In the introduction, he talks 
about human superiority, the soul, which places the human above animals, and about his 
verbal and cognitive abilities (Erjavec 1995:10). Nevertheless, he emphasises empathy 
that derives from marked anthropocentrism:
The human is master on earth. God Himself gave him the ownership of 
animals to preside over them. But the human should be a merciful and 
righteous master if he wants to please the Lord, who is love and goodness 
personified. The man must not force the animal to do the work he is able to 
do; he should not overburden the animal and should not beat it mercilessly. 
God allows the man to kill or slaughter livestock needed for food, clothing 
and other things. He is allowed to kill and hunt animals that present danger 
to him and his domestic animals or cause damage in general. He can kill 
all such animals – but torture he must not. (Erjavec 1995: 11)
In addition to his zoological observations of animals, Erjavec quotes Slovenian folk 
songs that describe individual animal species. He uses them to support his arguments 
and make them less scientific and readily understood. By applying fable and narrative 
literary styles, he combines allegoric anthropomorphism with anthropocentric viewpoints 
on animals (e.g., when he describes a cat fighting other cats, he adds to the description 
of a night-time fight a quote from a folk song that humanises the cat: “Prišel je domu ves 
zaspan / ko mežnar odzvonil je dan” (He came home half asleep/when the sexton rang 
the start of the day, Erjavec 1995: 41). 
His description of birds is also anthropocentric and anthropomorphic:
The Slovenian man liked to concern himself with birds, and so his songs 
are as picturesque as a green meadow. The birds share his joy and sorrow. 
It seems to him that the bird can understand him and he, in turn, seeks to 
understand its singing. He believes that the bird comforts him in his grief, 
at other times, it encourages him to work, and then again it mocks his effort. 
He transfers much of the bird’s singing into his own speech. When in spring, 
for example, he hears a nightingale sing high above him, it appears to him 
as if the bird is calling him to work saying: ‘work, work, work, plough, 
plough, plough, sow, sow, throw, throw!’ (Erjavec 1995: 283)
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Birds are, according to Erjavec, man’s friends, and he uses anthropomorphism in 
describing their dwelling. He states that freedom is the most important for every bird, 
and if you cage her/him you take her/him half of hers/his life away. To support that he 
quotes a stanza of a folk song: 
Ptica se brani službe [The bird does not want to work]
Nečem, nečem, mlada gospa, k tebi, 
ti bi mene v beli grad zaprla.
Raj odletim si jaz v log zeleni,
se nazobljem lepe frišne vode,
no zapojem z moje drage volje. 
No, no I will not go to you, young lady,
You will shut me inside a white castle.
I prefer to fly away to green meadows
To drink beautiful freshwater
And sing to my heart’s delight. 
(Erjavec 1995: 286; Štrekelj 1989, 951 Cerovec, redaction II, p. 789)
When he describes nesting, Erjavec the zoologist does not acknowledge the bird’s 
nest-building skill; he believes this skill does not derive from a cultural heritage: it is 
merely instinctive.
Every bird makes its nest in its own way, some more and some less artfully. 
Nesting is innate to the bird. Instinct, which we cannot explain, drives it to 
make a nest just like its mother did and all the predecessors of its species. 
We must not assume that it is taught the skill by the old generation. As the 
young birds start nesting, the old ones have long stopped caring for them. 
Those birds that nest only once a year would never see their parents make 
the nest for when they were little in the nest; all they cared for was food 
and not the nest. (Erjavec 1995: 286)
However, in the 19th century, scientific findings were based on the viewpoint of hu-
man superiority. Erjavec does not acknowledge any cognitive activity; he thought that 
it was impossible for the birds’ parents to teach their young. Today, we understand that 
these activities are connected to thought patterns and do not reflect genetic heritage only. 
For example, Yi-Fu Tuan wrote: “Weaverbirds are capable of having experience, which 
means that not all the details of their performance are controlled by heredity” (1977: 77). 
Erjavec presents his view on birds while at the same time he is instructive:
Having heard of the benefits of birds so far, a wise person does not need 
our recommendation, nor endorsement of birds. So, let me just briefly 
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explain here how best to attract these little workers into your gardens and 
woods. Your land should be a welcoming shelter where birds must not be 
disturbed and chased away. Children, especially shepherds, are to be strictly 
forbidden to search for nests, to destroy them or take eggs or fledgelings 
from them. In autumn as well, young birds must not be hunted and owls 
and buzzards must not be shot. If your neighbours will do the same, you 
will soon see the benefits of such husbandry. (Erjavec 1995: 294) 
In addition to being well aware of the benefits, Erjavec advocates good care of birds:
There are other ways you can attract birds into your garden. Make sure 
they have suitable places to nest, use hollow branches or wood pieces to 
make bird houses and nail or hang them into the bushy treetops. You will 
see how happy the birds will be and how quickly they will settle in them. 
Little birds, like the tit for example, really like the houses some 7 inches 
long and 3 inches wide; a round hole that the bird uses to go in and out 
should be an inch wide, and a stick should be placed in front of it so the 
birds can sit on it. It is good to cover the little house in moss. Starlings like 
bigger houses, up to two feet high and the hole must be two inches wide. 
In Germany, you will find several bigger and several smaller bird houses 
in every garden and that is why the trees there are clean and healthy and 
the garden is very profitable for the owner. (Erjavec 1995: 294)
He writes that he chooses holes inside trees or in walls and in church towers for starlings. 
The bird is very grateful for a box nailed up to a tree or under a roof. In the selected hole 
it accumulates dry grass, feathers, hairs or anything warm and soft for its nest. Each bird 
can build its nest in its special way. From the perspective of zoology, he describes in detail 
the homes of individual animal species, sometimes he objectivises an animal completely 
or tries to endear it to the reader by using the so-called negative anthropomorphism, which 
presents the animal as the human’s shadow; he also uses the same expressions as for the 
human dwellings, e.g., the rabbit’s (1995: 116) or the badger’s dwelling:
 
Its abode is truly something. A rather spacious bedroom is a fathom, 
sometimes even two fathoms deep underground with several 5-6 fathoms 
long, well-made tunnels leading to it from different directions […] As 
the home is completed, it gathers leaves, moss and grass for a soft bed. 
(Erjavec 1995: 198)
He states that animal behaviour and building homes derive from instincts and not 
awareness. He also emphasises the art of nest-building. In short, he acknowledges that 
some birds apply skill and artfulness when building their nests. When he depicts animal 
homes and their dwellings, he represents their homes and animal architecture, creativity 
and skills very clearly. 
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Erjavec is a representative of anthropocentrism. His descriptions of animals and 
observations of animal dwellings and homes express a viewpoint that draws a sharp dis-
tinction between the animal and the human being and also between nature and culture. 
For him, the animals’ building skills are nothing more than instinct, which he determines 
from the viewpoint of speciesism.
ANTHROPOMORPHISM AND ATTEMPT OF LITERARY THEMATISATION OF 
ANIMAL COMMUNITY
Anthropomorphism is a model or a point of view that ascribes human characteristics to 
animals, often unwarrantedly. In contrast, a complete rejection of anthropomorphism 
can be, according to some researchers, an exaggeration as they do not acknowledge any 
human traits in animals, which leads to the non-personification of animals, denying that 
animals have any cognitive abilities or other characteristics. This view seems to refuse 
any understanding of animal behaviour, as it is impossible to comprehend the animal 
other than from our human perspective (Grušovnik 2016: 69-82). Leesa Fawcett believes 
that: “Anthropomorphism is a necessary means we employ to make sense of and relate to 
other species’ experience because we still have no real knowledge of animal cognition. 
We must rely on our imaginations to make this link” (1989: 14). Her anthropomorphism 
is rather a kind of personalism. She says that “Humans are continuous with nature and 
not [its] most important member[s]” (Fawcet 1989: 15). Juliet Clutton-Brock also does 
not object to anthropomorphism, which has become a comprehensive area of ethologic 
research. “Anthropomorphism does not necessarily disrupt scientific observation but 
can support the continuity between humans and animals” (2005: 958). She also says, 
“Treating [animals] as individuals can have a dramatic effect on attitudes to animal con-
servation, and one can only gain understanding of the animal as an individual through 
anthropomorphism” (Clutton-Brock 2005: 958). However, many researchers disagree 
with the anthropomorphic viewpoint, believing it neglects true characteristics and needs 
of animals and that it merely applies human traits to animals, which fails to acknowledge 
animals’ subjectivity. Mitchell, for example, believes that anthropomorphisation is a 
mistake or even a scientific error and considers it as dangerous to animals as violence 
against animals. “But we have a practical problem in regards to the opposite movement 
(the anthropomorphisation of non-anthropomorphically designed animals), which is 
equally seen as an epistemological error and an ethical and political danger (Mitchell et 
al.: 1997). Ramirez Baretto agrees with him:
[the] error of anthropomorphism is the presumption inherent in attributing 
human attributes to animals. In so doing, we deprive animals of their own 
subjectivity and impose what Rosi Bradiotti describes as ‘an asymmetric 
relation to animals’ that is framed by power relations biased in favour of 
human access to the bodies of animal others. (Ramirez Baretto 2009: 526-32) 
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Steven Best is open to anthropomorphism. In 2009, he talked about cognitive ethology 
and acknowledged its value mostly on the basis of research into animals’ complexities 
(Best 2009: 15). He admits that anthropomorphism has value only when it comes to 
“critical anthropomorphism” as defined by Griffin in his two books Animal Thinking 
and Animal Minds. Best says,
But anthropomorphism need not be a scientific sin. Clearly, we don’t want 
to project onto animals characteristics they don’t have. But there are core 
commonalities between nonhuman and human animals, what Griffin calls 
‘critical anthropomorphism’, is our best access to understanding animals, 
and ‘objective detachment’ will block insight every time. (Best 2009: 17)
However, in 2014, Best changed his view completely. He sharply criticises anthropo-
morphism and equates it to speciesism (Best 2014: 97, 99, 154). Rosi Bradiotti, in contrast, 
criticises both anthropomorphism and the metaphorisation of animals in literature, saying: 
The old metaphoric dimension has been overridden by a new mode of re-
lation. Animals are no longer the signifying system that props up human’s 
self-projections and moral aspirations. Nor are they keepers of the gates 
between species. They have rather, started to be approached literally, as 
entities framed by codes systems of their own […] The metaphoric dimension 
of the human interaction with others is replaced by a literal approach based 
on the biovitalist immanence of life. The animal can no longer be metaphor-
ised as other but needs to be taken on its own terms. (Bradiotti 2009: 528)
Monica Libell is concerned with the question of anthropomorphism, which she aims to 
rehabilitate. She looks at the positive side of the anthropomorphic view of animals. “We 
anthropomorphise in order to predict, understand, and control our environment (Libell 
2014: 149; cf. Lorraine Daston 2005; Clinton Sanders 2008). 
Lockwood mostly concentrated on anthropomorphism found in the literature. He 
defined five types of anthropomorphism, which can be used in animal perception in lit-
erature, predominantly in fables. The first type is allegoric anthropomorphism, in which 
the story or the message is either more or less hidden or likeable. Lockwood, for example, 
mentions two modern fables, Watership Down (1972) by Richard Adams and Animal 
Farm (1945) by George Orwell. The fifth type is applied anthropomorphism, where we 
can apply our own experience in order to understand the other, understand what it means 
to be a member of another species (Lockwood 1989: 41-56). 
Anthropomorphism should be of service to animals, and if so, it should be accepted. 
However, it should be looking at an animal as an individuum with interests and not ap-
plying human interests on them or putting human interests before theirs. We should open 
another question about animal communication, to describe and understand animal sounds 
and postures; if we could decode that, it would be a break-through in our understanding 
of animals as persons and a step towards embracing them in the social community.
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I think anthropomorphism can be used in literature, especially in those stories in which 
animals are depicted as living creatures with their social and cultural system, but are very 
realistic and not allegoric. Thus, we can either negate anthropomorphism or apply it by 
“becoming the animal” or by an understanding of what it means to be a bat, for example, 
even if only to a small extent. Therefore, it is all the same whether anthropomorphism is 
an error or an aide in the understanding of our animal brothers and sisters. 
Richard Adams’s Watership Down (1972) includes both types of anthropomorphism, 
as suggested by Lockwood. We could also read this work as an attempt to understand 
animal individuals within a fictional story, the same way Namma Harel suggests we 
should look at fables. She believes fables do not marginalise nonhuman animals; some 
describe authentic animal behaviour and provide a critical look at human conduct and 
relationship to other animals. Consequently, she suggests a non-allegoric, literary reading 
of fables (Harel 2009: 9-21). 
In Watership Down, Adams writes about a group of rabbits who have to leave their 
home, which is about to be destroyed. Unsurprisingly, the destruction of their home comes 
at the hands of humans. The rabbits set off to find a new home in their native Hampshire 
(England), which they do at Watership Down – a real place, where the author spent his 
childhood. Here we have so-called speaking animals; we can observe animals’ social 
and political structure and culture that is expressed in anthropomorphic or personified 
manner. Anthropomorphisation can be quite damaging when it thematises a false reality 
or injects human traits into the animal world. 
Nevertheless, anthropomorphisation can be positive. Leesa Fawcett believes, “An-
thropomorphism is a way for life (humans) to know life (nonhumans)” (Fawcet 1989: 
19). However, is this not still domination? Can we not see animals as animals but only 
as a reflection of humans? It is true, though, that we cannot entirely grasp the cognitive 
dimensions of an individual animal, so the anthropomorphism and personalisation of 
animals help us understand their lives and dwelling, which this book proves. It borrows 
from the existing scientific research to show the organisation of a group of rabbits and 
adds anthropomorphisation, which allows the reader to understand the rabbits’ world from 
the human perspective as it is impossible for us to comprehend it in any other manner. 
Furthermore, it describes the rabbits’ homes, the making of homes and the organisation 
of their dwelling that is intentional and produces innovations that do not have merely 
instinctive patterns. It enables us to understand that animals do have their own culture. 
At this point, it should be said that not every case of anthropomorphisation is negative, 
especially when it presents animals as realistic creatures whose homes are endangered 
by people and their interests. Adams certainly uses critical anthropomorphism; his ani-
mals are aware that only the human being can be a threat, ruin their homes or even kill 
them. However, how does Adams make his story so believable, even though it is fiction? 
His description of the rabbits and their homes follows existing scientific observations.3 
3 Erjavec also wrote about rabbits’ dwellings. “Wild rabbits prefer to live on sandy hills, craggy rocks 
overgrown with bushes and other herbs. Every burrow is inhabited by a pair that does not tolerate any other 
animal. During the day they sit in their holes and at night they graze outside, but they never stray too far from 
their burrow.” (Erjavec 1995: 116).
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He draws from the research of Ronald Lockley, a biologist and ornithologist, who created 
an artificial rabbit burrow covered with a glass roof and observed the lives of rabbits for 
four years. Lockley described his findings in his book The Private Life of the Rabbit, 
1964, which Adams read and later included its findings in his work.
I think we can understand Watership Down and rabbits in the environment hidden 
to us if we use a system of “putting somebody in their place” –, and with this, we could 
achieve an ecocentric attitude with a consideration that all life is equal and connected. 
So, animals in such stories will not be considered as only imagined personalities but real 
animals with needs and interests, without a hegemonic attitude of humans regarding the 
destruction of their homes. Watership Down could be an allegory, but it can also be a book 
about rabbit homes, how they built their homes, and I think rabbits are more personified 
than anthropomorphised. 
In a book, wild rabbits can have their social structure, folklore, and culture, and the 
production of their homes shows intention and innovativeness. Looking at the story 
from the positive point of view, it strives to present the life and dwelling of the rabbit 
society so that we can have a so-called vision and knowledge of animals that originally 
feels alien, unknown. Therefore, we could say that in addition to applied and allegorical 
anthropomorphism, Adams also draws on the so-called constructive anthropomorphism 
(Bruni, 2018), or, according to Bekoff, “biocentric anthropomorphism” (2000), which 
means that a fictional story could even become possible. 
Adams’s descriptions of rabbit dwelling and the rabbits’ homes, as we can see below, 
might be called realistic anthropomorphism: 
The holes certainly were rough – ‘Just right for a lot of vagabonds like 
us,’ said bigwig – but the exhausted and those who wander in the strange 
country are not particular about quarters. At least there was a room for 
twelve rabbits and the burrows were dry. Two of the runs – the ones among 
the thorn trees – led straight down to burrows scooped out of the top of the 
chalk subsoil. Rabbits do not line their sleeping-places and a hard, almost 
rocky floor is uncomfortable for those not accustomed to it. The holes in 
the bank, however, had runs of the usual bow-shape, leading down to the 
chalk and then curving up again to burrows with floors of trampled earth. 
There were no connecting passages, but the rabbits were too weary to care. 
They slept four to a burrow, snug and secure […]. (Adams 1972: 137)
The rabbits have names and a hierarchical social structure in which female rabbits 
are subordinate. The rabbits also have their own folklore. Adams also includes folklore 
quotes from English folk ballads. For example, he takes the motto of Chapter 9 The Crow 
and The Beanfield from the ballad The Two Crows: “You will sit on his white neck-bone, 
And I’ll peck out his pretty blue eyes.” (Adams 1972: 50).
The value of Adams’s novel is in having the possibility to identify with animals and 
to understand them better. Adams also criticises anthropocentrism by condemning the 
destruction of rabbit homes; the human being destroys everything he encounters without 
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concern for animals and their homes. Adams quite explicitly presents rabbits’ behaviour 
and places the human as the rabbits’ main adversary. He expresses his ecocentric position 
through the words of Holly, a female rabbit: 
There’s terrible evil in the world. It comes from men” said Holly […] “All 
others ellil do what they have to do and Firth moves them as he moves 
us. They live on earth and they need food. Men will never rest till they’ve 
spoiled the earth and destroyed the animals […]. (Adams 1972: 159)
A description of people in chapter 27 is not very pretty either: 
Animals don’t behave like men,” he said [Strawberry]. “If they have to 
fight, they fight; and if they have to kill they kill. But they don’t sit down 
and set their wits to work to devise ways of spoiling other creatures’ lives 
and hurting them. They have dignity and animality. (Adams 1972: 245)
Eco-critic Lawrence Buell believes that rabbits that speak, rabbit sociology, culture, 
tradition, mythology and folklore included in Adams’s book constitute eco-criticism 
(Buell 2014). Adams does not place rabbits below human beings, so his work can be 
eco-critical. Rabbits are not metaphors for or symbols of humanity, although some 
believe they are an allegory. Adams’s writing may be fiction, but it is based on reality. 
Anthropomorphisation, in its true sense, is not an appropriate model for this book. It 
seems that the rabbits are autonomous in their actions, have agency, and they experi-
ence the world in their own way and not in the way people do. Perhaps this book is 
about personification; the author attempts to de-objectivise the rabbits and portray them 
as individuals, animal persons instead. Rabbits’ emotions, experiences of the world, 
descriptions of their imagination and cognitive abilities and planning skills all reflect 
the ecocentric viewpoint of the animal world. Adams acknowledges all these abilities, 
although it sometimes seems that he still draws from his own human experience. There-
fore, we could call this viewpoint fiction cognitive ethology combined with the criticism 
of human attitude to one of the animal species. The act of dwelling and the physical 
dwellings of rabbits in Adams’s work are the result of intentional activities; the rabbits 
not only dwell in this world but also change their world, living their lives according to 
their own rules. Their dwellings are not merely rabbit warren burrows: they are their 
homes, where they live their rabbit lives. 
ZOOCENTRISM, ZOOPOETICS, AND ECO/POETICS OR RESPECT OF OTHERS 
AND KNOWLEDGE OF ITS INHERENT VALUE 
Eco-bio-zoocentrism focuses on the animal (and all living beings, including plants, i.e., 
nature in general). Animals within zoocentrism have intrinsic value, are appreciated 
for themselves as living beings and not for being seen as an object of human interest 
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(Grušovnik 2016: 63). Zoocentrism could be extended to include the question of animal 
dwelling and physical dwellings, where their cognitive abilities and intentional production 
of homes is not negated. In contrast, human superiority and dominance are removed, and 
animals are not marginalised as inferior beings. 
Nevertheless, the question of the hegemony of human interests over those of the 
animal continues to arise when discussing animal production of homes and their cultural 
patterns, which leads to the destruction of their homes:
Human interests, even those considered most trivial or superfluous, go 
before the interests of other animals in keeping their lives and environment; 
this, of course, depending on the legal, social and economic taxonomies 
established by humans who act with or against those animals. (Kim 2007; 
Ramirez Barreto 2002) 
Human interests destroy animal dwellings, are aggressive towards the animal and 
are based on the so-called “natural differentiation” between animals and people. They 
legitimise violence and animal abuse. (Wolh and Emel 1998; Johnston 2008; Ramirez 
Barreto 2009: 86) 
Consequently, it is literature that enables us to understand animal cultural patterns and 
their so-called poetic dwelling. We might learn about animal productivity, for instance, 
the birds’ singing that a poet can reproduce or at least place it in the context of poetry. 
We may discover the poetry of dwelling when we observe a fish that is creating mandalas 
in the ocean, not because of instinct or to breed or similar instinctive act but merely as a 
tool of expression. The understanding we thus gain allows us to become aware not only 
of the ontological status of the animal but also of the truly creative cognitive process of 
animal dwelling culture. 
Zoopoetics was developed by Aaron Moe, who based it in the concepts of ecopoetics 
of Johnathan Bate. Although Moe originally belonged to eco-criticism, he moved on 
from it, as he says, “zoopoetics provides a theoretical focus to explore what poem does 
– as a verb – to our understanding of and relationship with nonhuman animals” (Moe 
2012: 28). Moe developed zoopoetics by observing how individual poets use poetry to 
form zoopoesis, such as animal sounds in poetry or the presence of animals as persons 
in poetry. In the work Poetry, Thought, Language (1971), Heidegger develops a hypoth-
esis on “interdependency between poetry and dwelling: ‘poetry and dwelling belong to 
one another … for poetry, as the authentic gauging of the dimension of dwelling, is the 
primal form of building.’” (as cited in Moe 2012: 29). However, Heidegger believes that 
poetic dwelling or dwelling through poetry is only a human capacity, which is a purely 
anthropocentric view that Moe disagrees with. When looking at animals, both in life and 
in literature, we cannot overlook the fact that animals have agency, which in itself is not 
merely instinctive but means activity that includes complete engagement, different from 
that of the human but still complex. Therefore, we agree with Moe that “nonhuman animals 
also dwell on the earth, engaging imaginatively with their own kind, with other species, 
with the environment, and with the human other.” (Moe 2012: 29). According to Moe, 
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looking at the bat as an animal that merely flies through space merely sensing it, without 
changing it, is characteristic of speciesism. Consequently, eco- or zoopoetics may show 
that that animals also develop a sense of space they populate and “nonhuman animals 
dwell imaginatively, rhetorically, and culturally on earth.” (Moe 2012: 30). Poetry and 
literature developed by the human can also reveal how animals understand and cultivate 
their living space, home production and dwelling.
Ramirez Barreto believes that the existing binary understanding of nature and culture, 
which sees the latter as a human characteristic only, should be refuted entirely:
I would like to reject an illusion considering the animal as determined, 
mechanical, instinctive and limited to mere corporeality (ontogenetic 
constitution), or as an evolutionary past that has been left behind with the 
acquisition of tools and language (phylogenetic condition), looking upon 
humanity as purifying and distancing its own human spaces, without animals 
(social, cultural and historical constitution). (Ramirez Barreto 2009: 84)
How can human literature allow us to perceive animal subjects and their physical 
dwellings? How can we even see and recognise them, comprehend their value regardless 
of our interests? Perhaps we can find the answers to all these questions in the poetry of 
several poets, for example, Jure Detela, and also in the zoopoetics of Iztok Geister’s 
work Narava kot jo vidi narava [Nature as Seen by Nature, 2010], which we have chosen 
for its zoopoetic descriptions of animal dwellings. The descriptions of animal habitats 
Geister speaks about in his ecological-poetic essay can be determined as zoopoetics as 
its thematisation of animals in literature and not for the “animal poesis” as defined by 
Aaron Moe when he researched the poetry of Cummings (cf. Moe 2013) and others. 
The contents of the essays speak about the way humans affect their dominance over 
animals and nature. This also refers to ecopoesis, which allows us to see nature, plants 
and animals as individual subjects with their habitat, the place where they dwell, build 
their own cultural and social systems and cry their silent screams when they lose their 
homes as their world collides with human dominance.
Geister speaks about different types of dwellings:
1. those made and inhabited by animals only,
2. those set up by people – cohabitation or destruction: positive and negative 
anthropocentrism.
Geister, the ecologist, defines the anthropocentric and economic propensities of 
people in the 19th century and the fact that the ethics of ecology is only slightly over 
a hundred years old. The Austro-Hungarian legislation, which was also in force in the 
Slovenian territory, protected nature purely for economic reasons. Christian ethics was 
the one to advocate mercy. However, in 1877 a song Siničja tožba [A Tit’s Lament] was 
first written by Andrej Praprotnik in 1844 and later adapted by Fran Levstik. The poem 
entered the realm of folk and became an educational song for children (in school only a 
poem), warning them about the unacceptable destruction of bird nests presented as birds’ 
dwellings (Geister 2010: 14, cf. Golež Kaučič 2003: 262). 
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Stoji učilna zidana, 
pred njo je stara jablana.
Ta jablana je votel panj, 
sinica znosi gnezdo vanj.
There’s a school built up of brick, 
An old apple tree in front of it.
The tree’s a hollow stump, 
A little tit makes a nest inside.
Sinica zjutraj prileti, 
na šolskem oknu obsedi.
Na oknu kljunček svoj odpre, 
tako prepevati začne:
The tit comes in the morning, 
On a windowsill it sits,
And opens now its little beak 
It starts to sing its song:
»Poslušaj me, učitelj ti! 
Kako se pod teboj godi.
Vsi dečki tvoji me črte, 
povsod love, povsod pode.
‘Oh, listen, teacher to me! 
Look what happens here.
All your boys hate me, 
They hunt me. They chase me.
Zalezli moj so ptičji rod, 
iz gnezda vrgli ga za plot.
Mladički tam pomrli so, 
oči svetle zaprli so.«
They searched out my young ones, 
And threw them over the fence, 
Where all my little babies died, 
There they shut their eyes so bright.’
»Grdobe grde paglave, 
masti ste vredni leskove.
Kdor v gnezdu ptičice lovi, 
ta v srcu svojem prida ni.«
‘You wretched rascals, you, 
Worthy of the hazel cane.
Those who hunt for little birds,  
Their cold hearts are their bane.’
Geister presents two parallel habitats, one where animals build their homes and 
the other where people create their cultural environment where animals can find their 
dwellings or people destroy the animals’ original dwellings. He calls these parallel 
habitats wilderness and culture, for example, a rain forest and a commercially exploited 
forest where the “ethics of cultural strategy in the forest lags behind the natural ethics” 
(Geister 2010: 19). Thus, he again allows for the binary nature of the natural and the 
cultural and does not acknowledge animal culture. William Hoppitt and Kevin Laland 
believe that: 
While the capacity for niche construction is universal to living creatures, 
human niche construction is extraordinarily powerful, in part as a conse-
quence of our culture. Perhaps what is unique about human culture is that, 
through niche construction, cultural transmission has become self-reinforcing, 
with transgenerational culture modifying the environment in a manner than 
favors ever more culture. (Hoppitt and Laland 2013: 158)
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Are ecological niches, natural dwellings that animals occupy, really less true dwellings 
than cultural niches produced by people? Geister remains within this binary viewpoint. 
However, his poetics allows us to understand animals and their homes, which they either 
occupy or build. Still, in his descriptions, we can observe positive anthropomorphisation, 
which enables us to understand better animal spaces as true homes. He only makes an 
exception in his description of reed beds, on the one hand, and the site of fire, on the 
other, where he presents the reeds as natural dwellings inhabited by various animals:
We can imagine a singular reed stalk as a skyscraper with various business or 
residential niches. Different lower animals live either on the façade or inside, 
where they feed, mate, lay eggs, spend their early lives, learn for life and lose 
it as well […] Birds that live in reeds make their nests among young reed 
stalks or on the broken wooden stalks. Warblers, birds that have completely 
adapted to the life in the reed metropolis, have allotted themselves different 
environmental niches; the Great reed warbler feeds predominantly in the 
reed flowers, the Eurasian reed warbler among the stalks and Moustached 
warbler can be found right above the water. (Geister 2010: 69) 
In addition to this description, he talks about the human destruction of animal homes 
and criticises anthropocentric activities that do not consider other – animal – interests 
but their own:
In winter the countryside marshes that are overgrown with reed beds are 
traditionally cleared with fire. After the first spring rain, lush green grass will 
grow on the site of fire. Of course, no one spares even a thought for animals 
that have lost their lives in the different stages of the fire and for the animals 
that have become homeless in the middle of winter. (Geister 2010: 70)
In his descriptions, which are rather essay-like, Geister’s writing is rather zoopo-
etic, not from the perspective of animal communication but, in his zooethical attitude 
to animals, it is reflected in his poetic descriptions of animal dwelling and way of life. 
This is the poetics of animal and nature combined with ecological findings and distinct 
anthropocentric attitude to animals and nature. The co-existence of all living beings 
in an environment is the so-called poetics of space, habitats, and animal homes where 
animals are visible or invisible, where the human helps to build the homes or destroy 
them. Geister is aware of nonhuman beings; he does not perceive them as something 
else or the other. His position is almost critically animalistic as he criticises the dominant 
human attitude towards creatures that people share their space with but often prevent 
animals from dwelling and developing their individual existence in that space. Geister 
sees birds just as birds and not individual specimens of birds, which makes him more of 
an ecologist than critical animalist, even though he warns about the human appropriation 
of nature. He believes that nature, animals and plants should find a mutual agreement 
without human intervention.
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Geister compares natural dwellings with “artificial” ones and discusses the so-called 
space inhabited by different animals, each one with its view of its dwelling, and individual 
usage that suits its needs and although the dwellings look the same, and they just may 
be given their names. This is how he describes a creek or a gully:
In the creek: the skunk and the otter find their hiding places among the 
intertwined bare roots of the riverside trees, in the clay walls of the crum-
bled gully, there is the kingfisher, a seemingly virtual being created form 
an apparition and reality. (Geister 2010: 106)
According to Geister, a manmade gravel pond, mrtvica, is a “cultural runt” (2010: 124). 
He compares spontaneously growing vegetation with a park. City parks host numerous 
animals precisely because they can find dwellings there: 
Not only the hundred-year-old trees, the pruned tree shoots and bushes too 
attract many animal cultural trackers. In addition to bugs and birds, hollow tree 
trunks host rodents and bats and there are quite a few kinds of finches nesting 
in the forked boughs. Many different birds nest in city parks, as in a kind of 
a spontaneous forest, which can be ascribed to the combination of various 
dwelling types; especially in winter the numbers of members of individual 
species increase, the result of milder urban micro-climate. (Geister 2010: 159)
Animals, therefore, create their own space and occupy pre-existing dwellings. Some-
times it is their artistic creativity that allows them to produce unique and innovative homes, 
but they are also happy to accept and settle in dwellings already prepared for them by 
the people such as the white stork:
There are not many places left where storks will nest on trees or rocks. 
The majority of them settle on houses, electric or telephone utility poles 
and in nesting places prepared specifically for them due to the stork’s deep 
symbolic meaning and value for people. (Geister 2010: 229)
This human charity stems only from specific symbolism traditionally ascribed to the 
stork. The stork’s interests that are merely for its benefit are not relevant: human interest is.
Although Geister’s understanding of animal dwelling is decidedly ecocentric and 
ecoethical, it still lacks personalisation; he does not acknowledge individuals within a 
species nor ascribe any intrinsic value to an individual living being. For Geister, nature 
is a homogenous entity in which individual species dwell and share space, sometimes 
more and sometimes less in harmony. Geister does not allow the animal to be in an equal 
position with the human; his thoughts are devoted to ecocentrism: letting the animals and 
nature manage their own status and dwelling. Nature becomes an omnipotent person and 
the human being merely intervenes, destroys dwellings, but with his interventions also, 
rather absurdly, provides them as well. 
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As long as the animal is considered to be a possession and human interests prevail over 
animal interests, their ontological equivalence will be no more than empty philosophical 
and anthropological babble. When humans understand that their actions do not benefit ani-
mals, when humans give animals space for their dwellings so that they do not have to keep 
retreating4 or even dying due to human interventions into “nature” and “animal culture and 
architecture”, then we will be able to talk about the equality of animal and human dwelling. 
Even more, humans will help build dwellings for those animals that have lost their own.
Can literature and how we read and interpret it aid in achieving this? Can it change 
our viewpoint and allow us to see the animal as our relative and its dwelling and physical 
dwelling as untouchable? Yes, literature can enable us to see reality from zoopoetic perspec-
tive. According to Lawrence Buell, ecoliterature shows empathy to animals and so human 
interest in such literature is not the only legitimate one (Buell 1995, from Starre 2010: 23). 
Ortiz-Robles writes: “Literature helps us imagine alternatives way we live with animals, 
and help us imagine a new role for literature in a world where animal future is uncertain” 
(Ortiz-Robles 2016: 5). He aims to focus his critical viewpoint on the damaging social and 
cultural practices, especially speciesism and any discrimination and demonisation of the 
other and to allow the creative energy of literature to enter the formation processes. Kari 
Weil thinks that literature could be the voice of the other and understands the “animal 
question” as the “broader question of language, epistemology and ethics women and post-
colonial societies already addressed” (Weil 2010: 4, 2012: 7). Literature makes it possible 
for us to see how animals accept and change the environment in which they live; authors 
can usurp the generally accepted viewpoint on animal dwelling as something static and nat-
urally determined. Literature that introduces eco-critical, zoopoetic, and critical animalistic 
points of view in its narrative and refutes the belief that only the human being can possess 
imagination, rhetoric abilities and the culture of life and dwelling can, based on observation 
and research, determine how many of these qualities can be attributed to animals as well.
However, do we truly believe that people are so original? Where is the proof based on 
observation that does not include the same communication as that of animals? Is it true 
that only scientific observation and experiments enable us to understand animals in their 
complex lives, creation and dwelling? We are still at the beginning of a different kind of 
thinking, and we still overestimate ourselves and underestimate the animals. Only when 
absolute communication with all living beings is possible, beings that will not live in fear 
of the “mad animal – the human” will the world of the animal other be revealed to us.
So, the answers to all three questions are:
1. Animals’ dwellings and their home production are an element of culture, involv-
ing crafts or even arts that are different from human craft or art and would not 
be considered biological predestination but creativity. Animals have their own 
cultural patterns and develop special skills.
4 The SARS virus in 2002 developed on Chinese markets with wild exotic animals; and most probably the 
Covid 19 virus also developed on such “wet markets” in Wuhan, China. 
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2. Animal home production might be an intentional act, but we cannot enter the 
minds of animals to determine that.
3. Through literature, we can see that negative and positive human and nonhuman 
encounters can be established, but negative ones still prevail.
Jure Detela, a Slovenian poet, was the only one able to understand that animal geogra-
phy and animal dwelling and production of homes are the same as those of the human, as 
he reveals in his poetic description of animal dwelling and dwellings of animals that live 
underground – either moles or rabbits. His visual horizon encompasses the understanding 
that everything is straight and plain, equality of all living beings, including those that 
are completely alien to us. 
Rovi pod zemljo, množica 
toplih rjavih teles, 
siva megla nad ravnino, 
jagode med zelenjem.
Vse sem že prvič videl 
v enem horizontu 
krog ene same ravnine, 
v celoti popolnoma sam
Burrows underground, a multitude 
of warm brown bodies, 
grey fog above the plane, 
strawberries in the green.
I saw it all the first time 
in one horizon 
across a single plane, 
entirely and completely alone.
(Jure Detela, Zbrane pesmi, Vol. II, 2018, p. 1140).
This viewpoint can be called pure zoo-ecopoetics and eco/zoocentric worldview. 
It is this kind of literature that reveals anthropocentrism, speciesism and non-critical 
anthropomorphism as anarchism and distinct errors of our world. 
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»ZOOPOETIČNO BIVANJE«: EKOLOGIJA POVEZANOSTI ŽIVALSKIH 
IN ČLOVEŠKIH BIVALIŠČ IN BIVANJ SKOZI FOLKLORNE IN 
LITERARNE REPREZENTACIJE
Marjetka Golež kaučič
Bivanje in bivališča niso samo človekova domena, pač pa tudi vsi prostori, okolja 
in domovi različnih živali. Na podlagi vprašanja, ali žival samo živi ali tudi biva, 
v članku razmišljamo o okoljih, kjer skupaj z ljudmi ali neodvisno bivajo in si 
gradijo svoja bivališča tudi nečloveške živali. V uvodu smo si postavili tri vpraša-
nja: Ali živali zavestno bivajo in ali so njihova bivališča del narave ali tudi kulture 
oziroma ali so njihovi domovi zgolj del neke instinktivne obrti ali celo umetnosti? 
Ali živali gradijo svoja bivališča zavestno ali zgolj instinktivno? Kakšne vrste ži-
valsko-človeških srečanj lahko vidimo ob opazovanju različnih živalskih bivališč, 
ko so ta oblikovana s strani živali ali ljudi, in kakšna so ta srečanja, ko živalsko 
bivališče trči ob interes ljudi? V poglavju Ontološka ekvivalenca ali ontološka 
diferenca živali in ljudi (bivanje/eksistiranje) se ukvarjamo z naslednjimi koncepti: 
živost in aktivnost bivanja, da živali komunicirajo med seboj, eksistenčna vrednost 
živalskih manifestacij. Dodajamo pa še antropološko izhodišče Tima Ingolda o 
ontološki ekvivalentnosti človeka in živali. Ugotavljamo, da je izrazita zmota, da 
živalim odrekamo sposobnost načrtovanja in miselnih procesov pri oblikovanju 
lastnih bivališč. Tako ljudje kot živali so graditelji in bivajoči. Torej, če oblikujemo 
svet, ga gradimo, takrat smo oboji tudi del kulture in ne samo narave. Toda kako 
bi lahko vedeli za ves notranji svet živali ali trdili, da se žival samo znajde na 
svetu, ga nič ne spreminja? To je izrazita antropocentrična zazrtost v svet; žival 
ne skoči v svet in nato iz sveta odskoči v smrt, ne, spreminja svoj svet, svet živali 
in tudi ljudi okoli sebe, in si gradi svojo lastno stvarnost. Skratka, žival ni samo 
tu, ampak ta tu tudi napolni s svojim lastnim odnosom do tu. Zato ni samo del 
narave, temveč ima svojo kulturo, oblikuje svoj svet, drugače kot človek, na svoj 
način. Zato poetika sveta ni samo poetika človeškega sveta, pač pa tudi narave, 
živali, rastlin. Na podlagi folklorističnih, antropoloških, filozofskih, ekokritičnih 
in kritično animalističnih spoznanj predstavljamo tri modele gledanja na živali ter 
njihovo bivanje in bivališča. To so antropocentrični, antropomorfični in zoocen-
trični model, ki se kažejo v delih avtorjev Frana Erjavca (Domače in tuje živali 
v podobah, 1868–1873), Richarda Adamsa (Watership Down, 1972) in Iztoka 
Geistra (Narava, kot jo vidi narava, 2010). Skozi predstavitve živali in njihovih 
bivališč v teh delih, ki so večinoma verodostojna slika resničnosti, ugotavljamo, 
ali lahko ta bivališča klasificiramo kot del narave ali kulture, z vprašanjem, ali je 
npr. bobrovo bivališče arhitekturna mojstrovina ali le dejanje, ki izhaja iz instinkta. 
Izhajamo iz temeljnega izhodišča, da so živali osebe in kot osebe zmožne bivati 
in intencionalno producirati svoja bivališča. 
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Ti trije primeri so obravnavani kot zgledi, ki pokažejo spremembo človeko-
vega odnosa do bivanja živali in produkcije njihovih bivališč, kot jo tematizirajo 
zooliteratura 19. stoletja, fiktivni roman kot fantazijski način antropomorfiranih 
živali in t. i. ekoliteratura. S pomočjo novega branja teh del želimo na zoopoetični 
način predstaviti resničnost bivanja živali v sodobnem svetu. Vsi trije primeri pa 
kažejo tudi na različne možnosti ali nezmožnosti sobivanja živali in ljudi ali celo 
na dominacijo ene vrste nad drugo tudi – ali celo najbolj – pri živalskih bivališčih 
in njihovi izdelavi ter nato zapuščanju, izgubljanju in ponovnem pridobivanju 
ali naselitvi. Erjavec je predstavnik antropocentrizma, ki s svojimi opisi živali in 
lastnimi observacijami njihovega bivanja in bivališč izraža stališče, da je ločnica 
med živaljo in človekom ter med naravo in kulturo ostra. V graditvenih spretnostih 
živalskih bivališč ne vidi ničesar drugega kot le del nagonskega ravnanja, ki pa 
ga speciesistično determinira. Adams poskuša na neki način približati bivanje 
in življenje divjih kuncev, ki jih ne poznamo, ki so nam pravzaprav zelo tuji in 
njihovo življenje zelo oddaljeno od naše percepcije le-tega. Njegovo stališče je, 
da imajo lahko divji kunci tudi svojo socialno ureditev, svojo folkloro in svojo 
kulturo ter da produkcija njihovih domov kaže na intencijo in inovativnost. Če 
pogledamo na to zgodbo s pozitivne strani, predstaviti življenje in bivanje kunčje 
družbe, da bi dosegli t. i. videnje in vedenje o živalih, ki so nam tuje in ki jih ne 
poznamo, lahko rečemo, da je morda Adams poleg aplikativnega in alegoričnega 
antropomorfizma uporabil še t. i. konstruktivni ali biocentrični antropomorfizem, 
kar pa pomeni, da je fiktivna zgodba lahko celo verjetna. Geister pa govori o raz-
ličnih vrstah bivališč: bivališča, ki jih naredijo živali ali se vanje samo naselijo, 
in bivališča, ki jih omogočijo ljudje – kohabitacija ali razdiranje: pozitivni in 
negativni antropocen. Geister prikazuje dvoje vzporednih življenjskih okolij, v 
katerih si živali gradijo svoje domove in v katerih ljudje gradijo kulturna okolja, 
nato pa v njih živali lahko najdejo svoja bivališča ali pa jim ljudje njihova prvotna 
bivališča v njih razdirajo. Bivanje živali pri Geistru, četudi je izrazito ekocentrično 
in ekoetično, pa je še vedno brez personalizacije ali upoštevanja posameznikov 
znotraj vrste in brez priznanja intrinzične vrednosti posameznemu živemu bitju. 
Narava je Geistru enovita entiteta, znotraj nje pa bivajo posamezne vrste, ki med 
seboj harmonično ali neharmonično delijo svoj prostor. Geister še ne omogoča, 
da bi žival kot posameznik zavzela človeku enakovredno pozicijo, je pripadnik 
ekocentrizma, ki zahteva, da pustimo živalim in naravi, da same urejajo svoj 
status, svoje bivanje; narava postaja omnipotentna oseba, človek pa po njego-
vem vanjo le posega, razdira bivališča, a jih hkrati s svojimi posegi tudi – kako 
absurdno – omogoča. 
V sklepu ponujamo odgovore na uvodna vprašanja. Živalsko bivanje in obliko-
vanje bivališč sodi v kulturo, njihova bivališča so ne samo obrtniško inovativna, so 
celo artistična, a drugačna od človeških. Niso produkt instinkta, temveč miselnih 
in ustvarjalnih procesov gradnje bivališč. Živali imajo svoje kulturne vzorce in 
razvijajo lastne spretnosti v graditvi bivališč. Prek folklore in literature lahko 
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odkrivamo negativna in pozitivna srečanja med ljudmi in živalmi, med katerimi 
žal negativna prevladujejo. Na koncu članka je navedena pesem Jureta Detele, s 
katero želimo prikazati, da le tovrstna literatura omogoča, da antropocentrizem, 
speciesizem in nekritični antropomorfizem postanejo arhaizmi in izrazite zmote 
tega sveta.
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